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D.R. Horton v. Betsinger, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 84 (Oct. 16, 2014)1 
 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: REMAND, AWARD, LIABILITY  
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that even when a case is remanded only in order for a trier of fact 
to determine the amount of punitive damages, NRS 42.005(3) requires that same trier of fact to 
first determine whether such damages are warranted. 
 
Background 
 
Steven Betsinger sued D.R. Horton, Inc., and DHI Mortgage Ltd., claiming fraud and 
deceptive trade practices. A jury found in favor of Betsinger and awarded him actual damages, 
emotional distress damages, and punitive damages. In the first appeal (Betsinger I)2, the Court 
reversed the emotional distress damages. The Court, however, declined to reduce punitive 
damages, concluding it could not determine what amount the jury would have awarded for such 
damages based on the now lowered damages total. The Court therefore remanded the case to 
determine punitive damages. 
 On remand, a question arose whether the new jury only needed to determine the amount 
of punitive damages or if it first needed to consider whether DHI Mortgage was liable for such 
damages. The district court ultimately instructed the jury only to determine “what amount, if any, 
Mr. Betsinger is entitled to for punitive damages.” Consequently, the jury awarded Betsinger a 
new punitive damages award. D.R. Horton and DHI Mortgage appealed, and Betsinger cross-
appealed.  
 
Discussion 
 
NRS 42.005(3) requires the same fact-finder to determine whether liability exists for punitive 
damages and, if so, the amount of damages 
  
 The Court remanded the matter for a second time, concluding that even when it remands 
a case in order for a fact-finder to set the amount of punitive damages, that same fact-finder must 
first determine whether such damages are warranted. NRS 42.005 governs the awarding of 
punitive damages. Subsection 1 defines requirements for punitive demands: “clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Under 
subsection 3, if the trier of fact decides to award such damages, “a subsequent proceeding must 
be conducted before the same trier of fact to determine the amount” of the damages.3  
DHI Mortgage argued NRS 42.005(3) unambiguously required the same jury to 
determine a defendant’s liability for punitive damages and if applicable, the award amount. The 
company therefore contended that the district court erred in instructing the jury only to determine 
the amount of damages. In response, Betsinger argued that the statute’s “same trier of fact” 
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requirement should not apply to cases on remand.  He asserted that applying DHI Mortgage’s 
interpretation would effectively result in a new trial for the company on the issue of fraud. 
The Court, however, declined to look beyond the statute’s plain language, determining 
that the text was clear on its face. Thus, the phrase “before the same trier fact,” indicates that the 
same trier of fact must determine whether punitive damages are applicable and if so, the amount 
of such damages. The Court rejected Betsinger’s argument that the application of NRS 42.005(3) 
would result in retrial, because in order to determine punitive damages, there was no reason to 
re-litigage issues concerning the other compensatory damages the Court previously affirmed.  
Therefore, when the fact-finder must determine the amount of punitive damages on 
remand, NRS 42.005(3) requires that same fact-finder to first determine whether such damages 
are warranted under NRS 42.005(1) (i.e., whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
defendant’s oppression, fraud, or malice). Although the district court’s instruction permitted the 
jury to award no punitive damages, the instruction did not require the jury to first make the 
liability determination. 
 
Attorney fees 
 
The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of D.R. Horton’s post-remittitur motion for 
attorney fees. Under the offer judgment rule, D.R. Horton was only able to seek such fees after 
the Court lowered compensatory damages in Betsinger I to an amount less than the company’s 
pretrial offer of judgment to Betsinger. Nevertheless, the company waited nine month to file its 
motion. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the delay unreasonable 
and denying the motion.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The jury instruction on remand did not comply with NRS 42.005(3), because it only 
tasked the second jury with determining the amount of punitive damages without first asking the 
same jury to determine whether such damages were warranted. Additionally, the Court found 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.R. Horton’s motion for attorney 
fees, due to the company’s nine-month delay in filing the motion. Accordingly, the Court 
affirmed the district’s court denial of the motion but reversed the district court’s punitive 
damages award and remanded for a new trial on this issue.  
 
